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Overview 
1. This memo explores transnational conflict in Africa. Section I is concerned with the 
wide (and under-acknowledged) extent and pattern of conflict between states and 
across borders, and how it may be researched. Section II is concerned with the 
implications for policy.  
 
2. The key research finding is that most armed conflicts in Africa have a significant 
transnational element. This inverts the standard trope that the vast majority of African 
conflicts are internal and not inter-state. Country specialists focusing on individual 
conflicts have made this observation for years: what is new is that the Transnational 
Conflict in Africa (TCA) dataset shows for the first time that this is a general 
phenomenon. This allows for a comparative analysis of the extent, patterns and drivers 
of transnational conflict, which allows us to move beyond imprecise metaphors such 
as conflict ‘spillover’, into a more systematic representation of the phenomenon, that 
puts transnational political rivalries at the centre of the story of conflict in the continent. 
 
3. The memo summarises and expands upon two papers on transnational armed conflict 
in Africa. The first is an occasional paper that introduces a new dataset; the second is 
a peer-reviewed published paper that re-describes patterns of armed conflicts in Africa 
on the basis of this dataset. The core finding of the papers is that existing datasets 
have systematically under-represented the level of transnational political violence 
(covert war, militarised disputes, support to state and non-state belligerents in ‘internal’ 
war and sponsorship of coups d’état and the suppression of coups) to such a 
significant degree that we need fundamentally to reconsider the received wisdom that 
Africa has experienced many civil wars and very few inter-state wars. The elaborated 
findings focus on the patterns of transnational conflict: how it varies from one African 
sub-region to another, how it has changed over time, and how different states pursue 
their strategies for transnational conflict in different ways. 
 
4. One important policy implication of the TCA data is that there is a mismatch between 
the norms and principles of inter-state relations in Africa (specifically non-interference 
in the internal affairs of other states) and the reality (widespread interference). Every 
  
African policymaker knows this. Public discussion runs on a parallel track to the 
negotiations over ‘real’ political dynamics. 
 
5. The TCA dataset project opens up a research agenda for studying the drivers, patterns 
and instruments of African inter-state rivalries. Several areas of policy-focused 
research need particular attention. These include: 
 
a. Boundaries, separatism and power hierarchies;  
b. Regional multilateralism, security communities and peace missions;  
c. Post-conflict reconstruction and security sector reform; 
d. Middle Eastern engagement in Africa. 
 
Section I: Summary of Research Findings 
‘Introducing the TCA’ Occasional Paper 
6. The CRP/WPF occasional paper introduces the TCA dataset, and the method whereby 
it was constructed. The TCA dataset covers the period 1960-2015 for the whole 
continent (both north and south of the Sahara). The data indicate that (i) trans-
nationality is a major feature of armed conflict in Africa, (ii) most so-called ‘civil wars’ 
are internationalised, and (iii) the dominant definitions of ‘interstate conflict’ and ‘civil 
war’ are too narrow to capture the particularities of Africa’s wars. The notion that Africa 
is a global exception, where inter-state wars are rare and internal wars are common, is 
not correct. 
 
7. The TCA dataset is built by combining, augmenting, and revising existing datasets, 
each of which captures some elements of transnational conflict, including interstate 
wars, external state support in interstate wars, low-intensity confrontations between 
states, external interventions in civil wars, and external support to rebels or coup-
makers. Principal among these are the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) which 
compiles data for armed conflict based on a threshold of battlefield deaths, the 
Militarised Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset compiled by the Correlates of War (COW) 
project, which focuses on low-intensity military confrontations between states, and a 
dataset of coups d’état. The new dataset was supported by expert inputs and some 
other new information that appears in memoirs, historical studies, and academic 
papers. 
 
8. The foundational datapoints for the TCA are those in the UCDP. While rigorously 
constructed, internally consistent and valid for the purposes for which they were 
specifically designed, these data have several shortcomings. Notably, the reliance on 
contemporaneous media and NGO sources means that covert armed action, which is 
not reported at the time, is systematically under-represented. This information typically 
emerges later, in historical studies or memoirs. It would not be feasible for the UCDP 
(or any other dataset that seeks to be up-to-date) to constantly revisit its previous data 
points every time new information comes to light, but this unfortunately leads to a 
distortion that is highly pertinent to the study of transnational conflict. The UCDP 
dataset also does not adequately represent cross-border support to belligerents, in the 
  
majority of cases that do not involve the armed forces of the supporting country 
actually crossing the border.  
 
9. The TCA dataset includes 2,977 transnational conflict dyad-years in total, of which 546 
are new observations (not included in the existing datasets). While conventional inter-
state war remains rare, inter-state rivalry using military means is common. 
 
‘Re-describing Transnational Conflict in Africa’ Paper 
10. The second paper examines the patterns that emerge from analysing the TCA dataset. 
Among the types of transnational conflict are:  
 
• interstate wars;  
• external state support to belligerents in intrastate wars;  
• low-intensity confrontations between states (militarised disputes);  
• trans-national insurgencies; and  
• external support to coup-makers or governments resisting attempted coups.  
 
11. The paper finds that the patterns are broadly similar both north and south of the Sahara, 
though there are important regional differences within Africa that should be explored 
more fully.  
 
12. Important changes have taken place over the decades. The immediate post-
independence period (1960-75) was characterised by pan-African collaboration in 
supporting liberation fronts fighting against Portuguese colonial rule and white 
minority regimes and by the counterpart destabilisation activities of those regimes; by 
a small number of territorial disputes; and by inter-state support for coups d’état (of 
which there were many). The 1975-90 period saw a changed pattern, dominated by 
rivalries among Africa’s emerging powers, including several overt interstate wars 
(notably Ethiopia-Somalia and Chad-Libya) and a high-level of cross-border 
entanglement in long-running civil wars. In the immediate aftermath of the ending of 
the Cold War, the number of purely internal conflicts spiked, followed by a trans-
continental engagement in wars in Sudan and Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo and 
regional engagement in west African wars. In the recent period, older patterns of cross-
border military engagement have been supplanted, in part, by military interventions 
authorised by multilateral organisations under the rubric of peace support operations.  
 
13. The last decade shows a growing trend of Middle Eastern engagement in African 
conflicts. Although the same exercise in re-describing the datasets has yet been 
undertaken for the non-African countries of the Middle East/North Africa region (i.e. 
the Levant, Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf countries), we assume that it is 
uncontroversial to assert that wars in the Middle Eastern region are similarly a hybrid 
of inter-state and internal. It may be the case that that there is no major difference in 
patterns of conflict between the regions on either shore of the Red Sea, or between 
North Africa and the Sahel. 
 
14. Consequently, the majority of African conflicts should correctly be re-classified as 
internationalised internal wars, while other forms of interstate violent or coercive 
  
actions are not uncommon. Under the narrow definition of a civil war—a war that is 
fought solely between a sovereign government and armed non-state actor within a 
country—there are far fewer cases of civil war in Africa than typically assumed. 
 
Section II: Policy Implications 
15. The first policy implication is that transnational conflict in Africa is an important and 
neglected research agenda. The lack of comparative research on this area means that 
policy implications are provisional. However, this memo explores some areas of 
interest. 
State Boundaries, Separatism and Power Hierarchies 
16. The key finding here is: the apparent stability of Africa’s inter-state order masks vigorous 
transnational power contests. 
 
17. Post-colonial Africa is remarkable for the stability of its inter-state boundaries and the 
scarcity of successful separatist movements. This is all the more surprising given the 
arbitrariness of Africa’s borders, drawn by the colonial powers in the 19th century 
without regard to local realities. There are two main prevailing explanations for the lack 
of border wars, separatism and inter-state conflicts. One is a legalistic explanation. It 
attributes the absence of African inter-state wars to the 1964 Cairo Declaration in which 
the OAU Member States agreed to respect colonially-inherited boundaries. A second 
explanation is that what matters in African politics is control over the national capital, 
as the seat of state power, so that administering the peripheries and controlling the 
frontiers does not matter much. The TCA data do not refute these explanations as 
such. What they do demonstrate, is that African states have routinely used force across 
borders, refuting the conclusion that there is an African inter-state peace. 
 
18. In the absence of territorial acquisition by stronger powers or the fragmentation of 
weaker countries, contests over the inter-state hierarchy of power are manifest through 
other mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms are formal, such as the allocation of 
roles and responsibilities in the AU and regional economic communities. More 
powerful states assume regionally hegemonic roles—the clearest case being Nigeria 
with respect to Liberia and Sierra Leone. Some are informal. There are a number of de 
facto cross-border buffer zones, such as the Ethiopian and Kenyan zones of control in 
Somalia, and (for a while at least) the Ugandan and Rwandan security perimeters in 
DRC. There are also countries that have de facto client or tributary status vis-à-vis 
stronger neighbors; this was the case for Chad with respect to Sudan in the 1990s, and 
for Central African Republic with respect to Chad more recently. 
 
19. Typically, African inter-state conflict consists both of sponsoring local armed groups 
and also engaging with national politics within the capital. States are highly unequal in 
their power, and their ability to project power either through military force or through 
financial patronage. Some states have seen themselves atop regional political 
patronage hierarchies. Libya under Colonel Gaddafi was a prime example; Burkina Faso 
under Pres. Blaise Compaoré a lesser case. In addition, some ‘rebel’ movements have 
proved more enduring or more capable than recognised governments. Examples 
include the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which 
  
outlasted several Sudanese governments and was more militarily capable than them, 
and the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) headed by Jean-Pierre Bemba, which 
was the senior partner in a security pact with the CAR government of Ange-Felix 
Patassé in the 2000s. Transnational political-military dynamics are amenable to a 
political marketplace analysis. Political markets are typically transnationally integrated: 
a buyer can purchase political allegiances and services across boundaries. This can 
range from renting a local militia to striking a deal in which the state itself is put at the 
service of an external patron. 
 
20. Disruptions or challenges to the inter-state hierarchy create conflicts. For example, if a 
regional hegemon is massively weakened by internal strife, then the governments of 
nearby countries may seek to challenge the declining power, or one another. This 
happened in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The potential for conflict may also not 
arise from governments but from former proxies which have lost their sponsor. An 
example would be the repercussions of regime change in Libya in 2011 for 
neighbouring countries such as Mali, which were destabilised by Tuareg armed groups 
that had long been armed and controlled by Libya, which were suddenly cut adrift when 
their sponsor was overthrown. Alternatively, a state that was formerly a junior or client, 
which is rising to a point at which it can challenge its former senior or patron, may 
pursue its ambition by renegotiating the status of client groups in their mutual 
borderlands. An example would be the rise of Chad vis-à-vis Sudan. From 1990 to 2004, 
Chad was a client state of Sudan. In the mid-2000s, as Chad built up its capacity 
through oil revenues, it saw the potential of parity with its erstwhile sponsor. This 
culminated in a proxy war in 2008-09, resolved with agreement on equal status 
thereafter. 
 
21. Another implication is that, politically marginalised groups within state boundaries 
have a credible call on engagement from neighbouring states, using well-established 
informal precedent and established military-political links. The obvious dangers arising 
from these situations can be managed through regional multilateral mechanisms, and 
are increasingly so managed. 
 
Regional Multilateralism, Security Communities and Peace Missions 
22. The key finding is that the informal power hierarchies within Africa’s regional multilateral 
organisations (the AU, Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms) 
reflect the same hierarchies and rivalries that previously drove transnational armed 
conflicts.  
 
23. In the academic literature, ‘security communities’ are defined as groupings of states, 
among which it is unthinkable to use force to settle disputes. Clearly, Africa has no 
security communities in this conventional sense—indeed the TCA data refute the idea 
that the continent as a whole represents such a security community. However, the 
complex and overlapping structures of the African peace and security architecture 
indicate that a norm has developed (since the 1990s at least) of resolving conflicts by 
diplomatic means, with overt use of force prohibited by the rules of the club. Hence, 
African interstate organisations are a special form of ‘security communities’ in which 
  
political disputes are managed by political bargaining, which includes informal 
elements coercion.  
 
24. The norms of non-use of force between states and respecting boundaries are routinely 
violated by covert military activities. All African leaders are well aware of this. But the 
norms are still espoused. This double standard—or, to use a phrase drawn from 
scholars of sovereignty, ‘organised hypocrisy’—means regional peace-related 
exercises are always dual track exercises. This is manifest in formal meetings and 
summits, in peace negotiations, and in Africa peace support operations.  
 
25. Formal interstate meetings. The utility of meetings and summits at the African Union, 
ECOWAS and IGAD lies in the combination of the formal agenda alongside the informal 
discussions and negotiations that can be conducted in parallel by virtue of the fact that 
so many leaders have congregated in one place. The current reform process of the AU, 
based upon organisational templates drawn from international consulting companies, 
wholly misses this essential point. African interstate organisations cannot be junior 
versions of the UN or OECD: their value lies precisely in the manner in which they 
provide a forum and norms that allow for informal political bargaining to be brought 
into alignment with the formal institutions and principles of the Pax Africana. 
 
26. Peace negotiations. Every peace negotiation must have both an informal track in which 
the neighbouring or intervening countries manage their interests, alongside a formal 
one in which the domestic belligerents negotiate their interests vis-à-vis one another 
and in the country concerned. This can be seen in the management of peace 
negotiations by (for example) ECOWAS and IGAD. Crucial to the efficacy of the informal 
interstate track is the extent to which the leaders of the neighbouring countries are 
bound by the same norms and principles of that underpin the domestic peace process. 
This puts several issues at the forefront. For example, whether frontline states through 
their regional mechanism should be mediators of a particular conflict while at the same 
time they among themselves are negotiating in pursuit of their interests? Where should 
responsibility for mediation lie in such circumstances of conflict of interest? 
 
27. Peace support operations. The AU and African regional mechanisms have doctrines 
and modalities for peace support operations that are distinct from those of the UN. In 
particular, neighbouring states are usually involved, and are ready to undertake combat 
operations involving casualties, and there are clear political stakes for the troop 
contributing countries. In short, the interventions are not neutral or impartial, and may 
be very robust. Such robust interventions by neighbours, driven by national interest, 
might at times contend with the objectives of a peace support mission as defined by 
the agreement that underpinned the mission, and its domestic signatories and 
international guarantors. One of the notable findings of the TCA data is that 
neighbourhood peace missions replicate many of the same geographical and political 
patterns of prior decades’ unilateral covert interventions and proxy wars. In short, what 
more powerful African states previously pursued through direct (covert) or proxy 
military activities, they now pursue under the umbrella of internationally-mandated 
peace support operations.  
 
  
State Fragility, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Security Sector Reform  
28. Key finding: neighbourhood security dynamics are a determining factor in state fragility, 
post-conflict reconstruction and security sector engagement. 
 
29. The re-characterisation of most African conflicts as internationalised internal conflicts, 
rather than internal conflicts, has far-reaching policy implications for those engaged in 
diagnosing state fragility, designing post-conflict reconstruction programmes, and 
engaging in security sector reform (SSR). All of these fields of policy are premised on 
the assumption that the state, its territory and institutions, are essentially self-
contained. If this is not correct, policies need to be rethought.  
 
30. State fragility indicators. The measurement of state fragility is based on domestic 
indicators of politics and governance, although it is notable that fragile and failing 
states often cluster together geographically. The TCA data imply that we need to be 
much more attentive to neighbourhood effects. 
 
31. Post-conflict reconstruction. In designing post-conflict programmes, policymakers 
focus on internal institutions and processes, and tend to neglect the importance of 
neighbouring countries, cross-border relations, and the foreign policy of the country 
concerned. The findings of the TCA dataset imply that all these elements should be 
given a much higher priority. 
 
32. Security sector reform/security arena stabilisation. The basic framework for SSR is the 
establishment of a national security architecture with a unified military, police and 
security institutions. The assumption, inter alia, is that all armed groups are either 
exclusively domestic political actors or that any external sponsorship they may have 
enjoyed has come to an end with the peace agreement. These assumptions do not 
hold: the transnationally integrated political marketplace and the high prevalence of 
transnational military engagement mean that armed groups will not relinquish their 
autonomous access to separate sources of support. Conventional SSR is not likely to 
be possible. 
 
33. An alternative framework is ‘security arena stabilisation’, which consists of negotiating 
an allocation of security roles and responsibilities among diverse autonomous actors, 
including of necessity their external sponsors. This needs to be a regional exercise, 
involving neighbouring countries and their links to domestic security actors.  
 
The Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa 
34. Key finding: the pattern of cross-border military engagement in Africa is similar to that 
of the Middle East and becoming more so, as Middle Eastern states become actively 
engaged in African conflicts. 
 
35. The TCA dataset indicates that patterns of interstate conflict in Africa have been much 
more similar to those in the Middle East—where cross-border conflict is the norm—than 
would have been supposed from the conventional story of lack of interstate conflict in 
Africa.  
  
 
36. A comparison with the Middle East highlights some of the key institutional and 
normative aspects of the sub-Saharan African experience. In the Middle East, cross-
border interventions are more commonly overt, and the region lacks a multilateral 
peace and security architecture.  
 
37. The Middle East (including North Africa) is characterised by two major differences. 
First, MENA interventions are much more commonly overt. This draws attention to the 
double standards in SSA. It also means that when a Middle Eastern country intervenes 
across its border, it needs to justify it to domestic publics and the regional community. 
This may be one reason why so much transnational military intervention in MENA is 
support for sectarian groups based on shared identity between sponsor and client. The 
‘real’ rationale for engagement may be narrow security, political or commercial 
calculus, but the public justification is identity politics. This public rationalisation 
generates a dynamic of its own. By contrast, in SSA the public façade of non-
intervention gives the intervening powers more freedom of action. 
 
38. Second, the Middle East lacks a regional peace and security architecture. In SSA, many 
current day cross-border military interventions are legitimised as peace support 
operations of various kinds. Although there are valid complaints that peacekeeping is 
being politicised, this places such missions under at least modicum of regional and 
international scrutiny. The African mechanisms are rarely enforced in North Africa (the 
failure of the AU efforts in Libya in 2011 are emblematic of this). Without these 
mechanisms, MENA interventions tend to be framed in more narrowly security terms. 
 
39. The increasingly assertive engagement of Middle Eastern states in African politics and 
security appears to be associated with changing patterns of transnational conflict and 
clear disregard for the norms, principles and institutions of the African peace and 
security architecture. In short, the MENA pattern is penetrating into SSA. For example, 
when Gulf states (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE) engage in the Horn of Africa, they do so 
overtly without reference to the AU norms, principles and institutions. In the 1970s, 
Saudi Arabia supported Eritrean independence movements and Somali irredentism. 
Today, Saudi Arabia and the UAE appear ready to back military rule in Sudan regardless 
of AU principles and decisions. Morocco and Egypt, as members of the AU, make a 
limited accommodation to these norms when dealing with SSA, but not when dealing 
with other North African states such as Libya. 
 
Conclusions 
40. The TCA dataset captures what observers of African politics and conflict have long 
known, namely that African states frequently intervene militarily in one another’s 
affairs, and most conflicts are internationalised-internal. What is new is that the TCA 
dataset provides a basis for moving this observation from the specific to the general, 
and providing a basis for comparative or general study of transnational conflict in the 
continent. 
 
41. This opens up a neglected research agenda, making the study of conflict in Africa more 
similar to the study of conflict elsewhere in the world. It focuses attention not on the 
  
purported absence of inter-state conflict, but on the unusual ways in which such 
conflicts are manifest. 
 
42. Bringing transnational armed conflict into focus, as an established feature of Africa’s 
political and military landscape, demands a number of adjustments to policy. Several 
of these have been summarised in this memo. Most important is a change in 
policymakers’ awareness: in structuring peace negotiations, designing peace support 
operations, planning post-conflict reconstruction including SSR, and engaging with 
Middle Eastern countries’ security policies towards Africa, the transnational dimension 
to African conflicts should be borne in mind. 
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